Kim Il-sung spoke up during a meeting with his close aides in September 1946.
“I had many thoughts while holding a commemorative event without singing our national anthem while celebrating the first anniversary of August 15. Originally, we should sing the national anthem or play music during such political events.”
Later, Pak Se-young, a defector poet born in Goyang, Gyeonggi-do (currently Seongdong-gu, Seoul), completed the lyrics starting with “Morning shines on this strong rivers and mountains” in May 1947. A month later, Kim Won-gyun, a former mine worker from Wonsan, Gangwon-do, set it to music. The North Korean People’s Committee decided to call it the national anthem. However, North Korea did not include related provisions in the constitution enacted in September 1948. Under circumstances where reunification was put forward as the reason for the regime’s existence, it appears they were conscious of the national anthem already used by South Korea (composed by Ahn Eak-tae).
Instead, North Korea’s initial constitution stipulated that “the capital is Seoul” (Article 103). The logic was that while the government was temporarily operating from Pyongyang while Seoul was occupied, they would eventually “liberate” the South, achieve reunification, and function as the capital in Seoul. This measure referenced West Germany designating Berlin within East Germany as its capital, fully containing the political orientation of overcoming division and complete territorial conquest at the time of the constitution’s enactment.
New Territorial Provisions and Altered Symbols
As the division of the Koreas prolonged, North Korea renamed it the “Socialist Constitution” in December 1972 and amended the capital to Pyongyang. Then, in April 1992, the year after South and North Korea simultaneously joined the United Nations, the constitution stipulated the national anthem composed by Kim Won-gyun as the national song. Unlike the previous constitution presupposing the recapture of Seoul, emphasizing independence by defining Pyongyang as the capital of the socialist homeland did not mean giving up reunification. Just like South Korea’s national anthem, North Korea’s national anthem also retained the expression “Samcheonri” (Three Thousand Li).
The atmosphere changed after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean relations as “two hostile states” at the ruling party plenary meeting at the end of 2023. In February 2024, North Korean media broadcasted a national song that changed “Samcheonri” to “this world” in the lyrics, and in April of that year at the completion ceremony of the Rimhung Street in Pyongyang, the unfamiliar expression “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national song” was used instead of “patriotic song.”
Then, it was confirmed that the expression “patriotic song” completely disappeared from the new constitution, the full text of which was released eight months after being amended at the Supreme People’s Assembly on March 23. In place of the national anthem, the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national song” took its place (Article 167). Even the vertical and horizontal ratio of the national flag was modified from the existing 1:2 to 1:1.65 (Article 166).
Removing the national anthem from the constitution is an extension of erasing unification, refusing to use the same terminology as South Korea, and an intention to formalize the complete separation of South and North Korea. The official background for tweaking the flag ratio has not been confirmed. However, considering that the existing North Korean flag’s ratio originated from the former Soviet Union’s flag, a communist-bloc standard, Kim Jong-un, who studied in Switzerland, likely chose a standard close to the internationally widely used 3:5 (1:1.67) ratio to pursue a “normal state.”
However, this constitutional amendment should not be viewed merely as Kim Jong-un’s personal preference or a belated attempt at globalization. North Korea has tinkered with its constitution at every turning point in its ruling line and inter-Korean and foreign strategies. December 1972, which completed Kim Il-sung’s single-man system by introducing the presidency, is a prime example. In April 1992, right after the end of the Cold War, the National Defense Commission was made an independent body in the constitution and entrusted to Kim Jong-il. Cornered by isolation following the collapse of the socialist bloc, it was a defensive constitutional amendment that early on concluded the succession system and put the military to the fore.
Kim Jong-un has shifted to an offensive stance since taking power, such as establishing the post of Chairman of State Affairs (June 2016) and codifying nuclear force policy (September 2023). This past March, “socialism” was removed from the “Socialist Constitution” maintained for 54 years since 1972 and changed to simply “constitution.”
Although the main text of the constitution still specifies it as a socialist state, it made clear that it will not be trapped in the framework of “one Joseon.” The new constitution’s territorial provision (Article 2) defines the armistice line as a border. The calculation is that turning inter-Korean relations into territorial and sovereignty disputes with a “hostile other country” can package military clashes as the legitimate exercise of a sovereign state’s right to self-defense.
Constitution Publication Presages a New Game Board
What is noteworthy is the timing of the publication of the full text of the constitution amended in March, which was only recently released eight months later. North Korea calculates propaganda activities in state-run media strictly according to time, place, and situation, so-called TPO. The timing of North Korea’s release of the constitution coincides with the physical severance of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) area, the progress of border fortification construction, and full-scale offensives on the UN stage.
In reality, coinciding with the release of the constitution, North Korea has been deploying rough and meticulous public opinion and legal warfare on the international stage as well. Regarding the DMZ landmine explosion incident that occurred last September, it sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, shifting the blame to South Korea and launching an offensive. Kim Yo-jong, deputy department director of the Workers’ Party, also poured criticism on UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who urged the restoration of inter-Korean communication channels and mitigation of tensions, claiming he “represents South Korea’s shameless stance.” Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-hui and Kim Jong-sik, first deputy director in charge of weapon development, joined in, issuing seven statements this month alone.
Ultimately, North Korea’s constitutional amendment may be a trailer for future offensive table-shaking. The fact that North Korea has pursued conciliatory policies in times of crisis and severed inter-Korean relations and pursued offensive foreign policies in favorable situations supports this. North Korea has already “loaded” China and Russia as reliable backers, and objective indicators such as a 3% range growth rate in real gross domestic product (GDP) for three consecutive years from 2023 to last year are also showing stability.
Kim Jong-un’s grip on power is also solid. Considering North Korea’s practice of changing strategies and policies first and then reflecting them in the constitution, North Korea’s attempts to change the status quo on the Korean Peninsula may have already begun.
If one looks at Kim Jong-un’s North Korea with a gaze accustomed to the eras of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, the likelihood of facing another trial and error is high.
