Is China harvesting salmon or initiating nonconfrontational expansion in disputed Yellow Sea zone?

[NEWS ANALYSIS]

China appears to be reviving its now-familiar “gray zone” tactics — subtle, nonmilitary maneuvers to expand control without open confrontation — this time in the Yellow Sea aimed at Korea.

The recent installation of two large steel structures in contested waters sparked concerns in Seoul. Officials and experts warn the move could mark the beginning of a campaign by China to gradually solidify its presence in the area — first by deploying minor installations like artificial structures or civilian vessels, and then, after gauging the other side’s reaction, asserting de facto jurisdiction.

China’s Yellow Sea Gray Zone Tactics Raise Tensions with Korea

The platforms were installed within the Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ), a jointly managed area where the two nations’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) overlap.

Beijing has described the structures as “aquaculture” platforms, and Korean officials have so far internally assessed them as fisheries-related.

Critics, however, warn that such claims should not be taken at face value given China’s long track record of expanding maritime control through indirect and incremental means.

Analysts point to similar cases in the South China Sea, where China began constructing artificial islands in the Spratly Islands in 2013. Although the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines in 2016, China ignored the decision and continued building. The islands are now heavily militarized.

New Platforms Spark Sovereignty Concerns

In the East China Sea, China unilaterally developed natural gas fields in a disputed area with Japan.

And in the Taiwan Strait, it has dispatched maritime militia vessels to gradually weaken the unofficial boundary between Taiwan and the mainland.

Now, observers believe that China is applying the same playbook in the Yellow Sea: avoiding overt military confrontation while creating a narrative on the ground to make it seem as if the area naturally falls under Beijing’s influence.

The PMZ was established in 1996 after the two countries declared overlapping EEZs under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). After 29 rounds of negotiations, Korea and China have yet to reach an agreement on a formal maritime boundary.

Kang Jun-young, a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, warned that any change within the PMZ “requires joint verification.”

“These structures could evolve into military outposts, just as in the South China Sea,” he said. “There is concern it could even constrain combined naval operations by South Korea, the United States and Japan.”

China placed the platforms just west of the PMZ’s median line — closer to China’s claimed side — allowing Beijing to frame them as being within its “coastal waters.” This calculated placement, experts say, enables China to avoid immediate escalation while testing Seoul’s resolve.

“If future installations cross the median line into our side of the PMZ, we may have to respond by sending military vessels,” said a Korean government source. “It’s clear China is watching our reaction carefully and staying just short of crossing the red line.”

To avoid legal repercussions, China continues to emphasize the civilian nature of the facilities.

State media has repeatedly reported on successful salmon harvests at the “Shenlan No. 1 and No. 2” platforms, framing them as examples of sustainable aquaculture.

Subtle Encroachment, Strategic Placement

A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Seoul reiterated on March 26 that they are “reasonably” using marine resources “within its coastal waters” for “aquaculture” purposes.

Analysts believe China’s choice of floating platforms, rather than fixed installations like artificial islands or drilling rigs, is also viewed by analysts to avoid accusations of territorial aggression.

There are growing rumors that China may expand the project to include up to 12 such structures.

When asked by the JoongAng Ilbo about further installations, the Chinese Embassy declined to comment, leaving open the possibility of continued expansion.

Kim Doo-young, former deputy registrar of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, warned in a recent forum that Korean fishing operations in the PMZ “could become impossible” if more platforms are installed.

The Korean government finds itself in a bind.

As a countermeasure, the Korean Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries installed a stationary buoy some distance away from the Chinese platforms — but it is seen as an apparent symbolic move rather than a solution.

Diplomatic and Legal Responses Under Review

Korea continues to press China for on-site verification and is reviewing legal options.

Calls for stronger responses are growing, while some experts warn that reactive strategies could backfire.

“China may very well be building these structures with sovereignty in mind,” said Lee Wang-hwi, a professor of political science at Ajou University. “But we have to be careful turning this into a domestic political issue or raising negotiation expectations within ourselves too hastily.”

BY PARK HYUN-JU [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]